# Battlefield Innovations: Drones, Lasers, and Deep Strikes Newsy: Battlefield Technology Weekly Published: 2026-02-19T19:10:00.214Z Source: https://newsyai.com/edition/5181c997-9ca9-455e-8e64-c87b3969cd87 Archive: https://newsyai.com/newsy/21cd6d8a-6300-4084-8e5c-e1a2ea44b77f.md --- # Battlefield Tech Weekly — 10‑minute brief (Week of February 19, 2026) This week’s signals: Marines trial fiber‑optic FPV drones to beat jamming; a U.S. laser incident triggers airspace crises (and balloons); Ukraine keeps stretching deep‑strike range and hits Black Sea oil logistics; the U.S. Navy launches a partner‑borne interceptor USV in the Indian Ocean; HPM edges toward doctrine and exports; Red Sea traffic inches back with skiff scares; and autonomy for CCA wingmen moves from slides to flight lines. --- ## 1) Jamming is dead (for some drones): Marines test fiber‑optic FPVs - What’s new - The U.S. Marine Corps just ran its first field evaluation of small first‑person‑view drones hard‑wired with fiber‑optic tethers—so there’s no radio link to jam—at Camp Pendleton in late January. The trial, run with the Defense Innovation Unit and vendors, focused on cable performance, setup in full kit, and integration with tactical C2. ([nationaldefensemagazine.org](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2026/2/19/marines-testing-first-person-view-drones-for-electronic-warfare?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - Ukraine proved that fiber‑optic FPVs bypass traditional electronic warfare (EW). The U.S. adopting them signals a shift: when the spectrum is hostile, bring your own wire. Expect platoon‑level options for precision strikes in GPS/comm‑denied zones. ([nationaldefensemagazine.org](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2026/2/19/marines-testing-first-person-view-drones-for-electronic-warfare?utm_source=openai)) - Short, true story - At Pendleton, Marines drove an FPV through a jamming profile and never lost video—the cable never cared that the airwaves were dirty. Operators then graded how fast teams could spool, move, and re‑engage. ([nationaldefensemagazine.org](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2026/2/19/marines-testing-first-person-view-drones-for-electronic-warfare?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Offense: fiber FPVs will spread beyond Ukraine. Defense: you need non‑kinetic effects that fry electronics, not links—see Section 5 on high‑power microwaves (HPM). ([asdnews.com](https://www.asdnews.com/news/defense/2026/01/13/epirus-leonidas-demos-successful-use-highpower-microwave-defeat-fiberoptic-controlled-uas?utm_source=openai)) Definitions: - FPV (first‑person‑view) drone: a small quadcopter/pusher where an operator flies via a live video feed. - C2 (command and control): tools and processes to direct forces. --- ## 2) Lasers meet reality: the El Paso “balloon shoot” and what it means - What’s new - After a LOCUST laser deployment near El Paso earlier this month, federal agencies temporarily closed airspace. A subsequent probe found at least some engagements hit party balloons, not cartel drones—exposing shaky inter‑agency authority, ID, and safety playbooks for directed‑energy (DE) in civilian airspace. ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - DE is now operational enough to disrupt airports—so rules, IFF‑like procedures for small objects, and “laser NOTAMs” must catch up. The tech works; the governance lags. ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) - Short, true story - For hours, El Paso International operated under laser‑driven restrictions while agencies argued scopes and authorities—then reopened the same day. The drones? In part, party balloons. ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Bases and ports adding lasers need a civilian deconfliction book on Day 1: airspace kill boxes, ground observers, “ID‑to‑shoot” checklists, and rapid comms with aviation authorities. Definitions: - DE (directed energy): weapons like lasers and HPM that disable targets with energy instead of explosives. - IFF (Identification Friend or Foe): a system to identify aircraft/vehicles; here, shorthand for positive ID processes. --- ## 3) Deep strikes as “long‑range sanctions”: Ukraine pushes further and hits oil logistics - What’s new - Ukraine claims a new range record with a long‑range drone strike on the Ukhta refinery in Russia’s Komi Republic—roughly 1,700+ km from Ukraine’s border—days after a separate hit forced Lukoil’s Volgograd plant to suspend processing. ([yahoo.com](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukraine-war-latest-sbu-claims-185024516.html?utm_source=openai)) - A separate Ukrainian drone attack ignited fires at the Black Sea port of Taman, damaging an oil tank, a warehouse, and terminals. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/90e731743c18d6d82c343314e07b1630?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - “Economy of force” now includes refineries, depots, and port nodes; cheap, attritable drones are creating spiky outages that ripple through logistics, repair budgets, and insurance markets. Nets and cages over tanks aren’t enough when attackers pick vulnerable aim points. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/90e731743c18d6d82c343314e07b1630?utm_source=openai)) - Short, true stories - Ukhta saw a smoke plume and flight restrictions after a strike nearly 2,000 km from frontline—proof that deep rear areas are no sanctuary. In Taman, fires at terminals flared on satellite and social video just before new Geneva talks. ([themoscowtimes.com](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/12/ukrainian-drone-attack-sparks-fire-at-lukoil-refinery-in-republic-of-komi-a91930?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Expect Russia to harden valve galleries, pipe racks, and control rooms—not just tank roofs—and to disperse bottleneck units. Ukraine’s “long‑range sanctions” will keep tugging at refinery runs through mid‑2026 unless defenses adapt. Definitions: - Attritable: low‑cost and acceptable to lose in combat. --- ## 4) The sea fight: partner‑launched interceptor USVs and a shadow‑fleet showdown - What’s new - The U.S. Navy launched a 12‑ft, solar‑powered Lightfish interceptor unmanned surface vessel (USV) from a Seychelles Coast Guard ship during exercise Cutlass Express—the first time the system deployed from a partner vessel. It’s built for long‑endurance, modular missions with minimal comms. ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/11/u-s-navy-test-launches-interceptor-lightfish-drone-from-seychelles-coast-guard-ship?utm_source=openai)) - Russia threatened to use its navy to “protect” shadow‑fleet tankers from European seizures, escalating rhetoric around sanctions enforcement at sea. ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/17/russia-threatens-to-deploy-navy-vessels-shadow-fleet-europe?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - Small, attritable USVs are now expeditionary and shareable—partners can launch and host them, boosting regional maritime domain awareness on the cheap. Meanwhile, economic warfare at sea is bumping into gray‑zone naval brinkmanship. - Short, true stories - In the Indian Ocean, a Seychelles auxiliary launched an American interceptor USV to practice maritime interdiction with limited links—exactly the profile you’d want for watching a vast EEZ with few ships. In Europe, a shadow‑fleet tanker was released after a big fine; Moscow answered with naval threats. ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/11/u-s-navy-test-launches-interceptor-lightfish-drone-from-seychelles-coast-guard-ship?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Expect more “BYO‑drone” combined ops, with allies fielding persistent USV pickets. Also expect tighter EU‑UK‑US legal toolkits—and counter‑moves—to pressure sanction‑evading logistics. Definitions: - USV: unmanned surface vessel. - EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a state’s maritime zone for resource rights, up to 200 nautical miles. --- ## 5) Non‑kinetic layers mature: HPM proves it can kill fiber‑optic drones—and goes global - What’s new - Epirus released footage of its Leonidas HPM disabling a fiber‑optic‑guided FPV during a December U.S. government range test, addressing a class of drone intentionally immune to RF jamming. ([asdnews.com](https://www.asdnews.com/news/defense/2026/01/13/epirus-leonidas-demos-successful-use-highpower-microwave-defeat-fiberoptic-controlled-uas?utm_source=openai)) - Singapore’s DSTA signed an MoU with Epirus to study HPM C‑UAS (counter‑drone) options, including against fiber‑optic and AI‑enabled drones—HPM is moving from U.S. demos to Asia‑Pacific interest. ([aviationweek.com](https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/singapore-epirus-agree-study-high-power-microwave-c-uas-capability?utm_source=openai)) - Prior live trials showed Leonidas knocking down entire swarms (61/61 targets; 49 with one pulse), and new open‑source modeling gives planners better safety and effects estimates. ([tomshardware.com](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/high-power-microwave-system-downs-49-drones-in-one-shot-weaponized-electromagnetic-interference-erases-drone-swarms-en-masse?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - The defensive “one‑to‑many” shot is real. Against fiber‑optic FPVs and mixed swarms, an electronics kill complements guns/lasers and preserves missiles for the rare hard threats. - Short, true story - At an Indiana demo, observers watched a mixed swarm fall near‑simultaneously, with software shaping where some drones crashed—pointing to controlled, selective effects rather than indiscriminate blasting. ([tomshardware.com](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/high-power-microwave-system-downs-49-drones-in-one-shot-weaponized-electromagnetic-interference-erases-drone-swarms-en-masse?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Expect base and ship defenses to budget at least one non‑kinetic lane (HPM or laser) and to publish exclusion/safety rules so they can use it near cities and ports. Modeling tools to size “keep‑out” zones will speed adoption. ([arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.08477?utm_source=openai)) Definitions: - HPM (high‑power microwave): directed energy that disables electronics over an area. - C‑UAS: counter‑unmanned aircraft system. --- ## 6) Red Sea: traffic resumes, but skiffs keep everyone twitchy - What’s new - Following the late‑2025 pause in Houthi attacks, carriers like Maersk resumed some Suez routes in January. This week, UKMTO downgraded a reported armed incident 70 nm SW of Aden to “warning shots” with no vessel targeted—still a reminder that the lane isn’t normal yet. ([marineinsight.com](https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/ukmto-advises-vessels-to-transit-with-caution-after-warning-shots-near-aden/?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - Even when the missile‑and‑drone threat dips, small‑boat harassment and misreports can trigger over‑reactions. Cheap, embarked defenses remain the baseline; missiles stay in reserve. - Short, true story - A skiff approached; shots fired—initially logged as an attack, later corrected as warnings only. The advisory stayed: transit with caution. That’s the new normal. ([marineinsight.com](https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/ukmto-advises-vessels-to-transit-with-caution-after-warning-shots-near-aden/?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Shippers will keep hedging with route flexibility and onboard counter‑drone/small‑boat kits. Navies will standardize low‑cost defensive layers to avoid the 2024–25 missile‑spend trap. Definitions: - UKMTO: UK Maritime Trade Operations, a naval advisory cell for merchant shipping. --- ## 7) Autonomy is the new airframe: CCA “mission brains” in flight test - What’s new - The U.S. Air Force named Collins Aerospace and Shield AI as “mission autonomy” vendors for Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). General Atomics has already flown its YFQ‑42A with Collins’ system; Shield AI expects flight tests on Anduril’s YFQ‑44A in the near term. ([defensedaily.com](https://www.defensedaily.com/usaf-cca-mission-autonomy-phase-begins-with-software-from-collins-aerospace-and-shield-ai/air-force/?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - Mission autonomy that re‑routes around no‑fly zones and reacts under comms limits is a direct answer to the jammed, GPS‑denied fights we’re watching—from Ukraine to the Western Pacific. ([airandspaceforces.com](https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0/?utm_source=openai)) - Short, true story - After the Feb. 12–13 disclosures, vendors highlighted intent‑based control: “tell the drone what to achieve, not how,” then let it avoid pop‑up threats and still finish the job. That’s operator workload reduced by software. ([airandspaceforces.com](https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0/?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Nations that scale testing and safety cases for autonomy will field useful mass fast; those chasing exquisite airframes without brains will pay more for less. Definitions: - CCA (Collaborative Combat Aircraft): uncrewed “wingmen” that team with manned fighters. --- ## 8) Indo‑Pacific gray zone: first PLA drone overflight of Taiwan’s territory resets the bar - What’s new - On January 17, a Chinese WZ‑7 “Soaring Dragon” HALE drone crossed into Taiwan’s territorial airspace over Pratas Island for minutes—the first known PLA drone overflight of Taiwan’s territory. Taipei logged it; Beijing got a precedent. ([ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/4b73bf1c-76a4-426f-a335-de8528b24acb?utm_source=openai)) - What the region is revealing - High‑altitude uncrewed overflights probe legal red lines without the risk of downed pilots. They create “lawfare” dilemmas: shoot and escalate, or accept gradual normalization. ([taipeitimes.com](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2026/02/02/2003851601?utm_source=openai)) - Short, true story - Taiwan said the WZ‑7 flew above the reach of many island‑based air defenses and left after radio warnings. No shots—big precedent. ([taipeitimes.com](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/01/18/2003850781?utm_source=openai)) - Strategic implication - Expect more over‑islet flights (Pratas, Kinmen) and allied “archipelago” deterrence: mobile anti‑ship batteries, drones, and balloons to complicate PLA planning. Definitions: - HALE: high‑altitude, long‑endurance UAV. - Lawfare: using legal frameworks as a tool of coercion. --- ## 9) Europe’s navigation war: GNSS interference is a daily reality - What’s new - Europe has logged dozens of major GNSS (satellite navigation) interference incidents since 2024–25. A high‑profile case: suspected Russian GPS jamming affected EU Commission President von der Leyen’s aircraft over Bulgaria last fall; NATO pledged to counter the growing threat. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/51fa78294c2d0464dce5fd24dd4f273b?utm_source=openai)) - What the battlefield is revealing - Jammed or spoofed navigation is now routine across the Baltic‑Nordic‑Black Sea arcs, stressing civil aviation and military ops alike. Hardening PNT (positioning, navigation, timing) is no longer optional. - Strategic implication - Expect regional investments in multi‑constellation, multi‑sensor navigation; eLoran revival in pockets; and “navigation NOTAMs” that trigger reroutes on bad days. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/6efed7d030da19a51dfacec39ed77325?utm_source=openai)) Definitions: - GNSS: satellite navigation constellations like GPS, Galileo, GLONASS. - PNT: positioning, navigation, and timing services. --- ## 10) What this week’s fights say about tomorrow’s wars - Lasers and HPM need governance as much as generators - The El Paso episode shows DE is here—and that airspace rules, target ID standards, and inter‑agency comms must be written before the first shot, not after. Operational DE without governance risks own‑goals and shutdowns. ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) - Offense keeps finding the economic seam - Ukraine’s long‑range, attritable drones keep making refineries and ports part of the front line. Defenses must focus on aim‑point defeat (valves, racks, control rooms) and quick restart, not just nets over tanks. ([themoscowtimes.com](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/12/ukrainian-drone-attack-sparks-fire-at-lukoil-refinery-in-republic-of-komi-a91930?utm_source=openai)) - Partnered autonomy and small robots extend sea denial - A partner‑launched USV in the Indian Ocean points to modular, shareable maritime ISR/interdiction at low cost—useful against smuggling, piracy, and sanction‑evading fleets. ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/11/u-s-navy-test-launches-interceptor-lightfish-drone-from-seychelles-coast-guard-ship?utm_source=openai)) - Spectrum‑proof offense is driving spectrum‑indifferent defense - Fiber‑optic FPVs and autonomy push defenders toward HPM and lasers. Expect “missiles for the few; electrons for the many” to become doctrine. ([asdnews.com](https://www.asdnews.com/news/defense/2026/01/13/epirus-leonidas-demos-successful-use-highpower-microwave-defeat-fiberoptic-controlled-uas?utm_source=openai)) --- ## Tactics and kit to copy now 1) Add a non‑kinetic lane to any critical site. - Pair a 20–50 kW laser or HPM with 30–35 mm airburst guns and mini‑missiles; publish airspace and safety SOPs to avoid an “El Paso moment.” ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) 2) Harden for aim‑point defeat. - Protect control rooms and valve galleries; add thermal masking and decoys; simulate repair/restart drills. Recent refinery hits show the attacker’s aim points are smarter than the net. ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/90e731743c18d6d82c343314e07b1630?utm_source=openai)) 3) Train fiber‑optic FPV teams and counters in the same unit. - Offense: master spooling, movement, and cable management under fire. Defense: deploy HPM or close‑in guns with rapid cueing; rehearse switchover when jamming fails. ([nationaldefensemagazine.org](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2026/2/19/marines-testing-first-person-view-drones-for-electronic-warfare?utm_source=openai)) 4) Practice partner‑hosted unmanned ops at sea. - Build playbooks to launch/recover USVs from allied hulls; fuse their feeds into your maritime picture without high‑bandwidth links. ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/11/u-s-navy-test-launches-interceptor-lightfish-drone-from-seychelles-coast-guard-ship?utm_source=openai)) 5) Update ROE for high‑altitude uncrewed overflights and balloons. - Define ID thresholds, intercept options, and messaging when a HALE UAV clips territorial airspace—or when a balloon front‑runs a raid. ([ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/4b73bf1c-76a4-426f-a335-de8528b24acb?utm_source=openai)) --- ## Short, true stories to anchor the trends - Balloons vs. lasers - A U.S. laser shot objects over El Paso—some proved to be party balloons—forcing an airport shutdown and a Washington blame game. Lasers are operational; procedures aren’t. ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) - A refinery nearly 2,000 km from the front - Ukhta’s Lukoil plant burned after a one‑way drone reached deep into Russia’s north. Airports paused; videos showed the plume. Depth is no longer safety. ([themoscowtimes.com](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/12/ukrainian-drone-attack-sparks-fire-at-lukoil-refinery-in-republic-of-komi-a91930?utm_source=openai)) - A partner launches an American USV - Off Seychelles, a coast guard auxiliary put a U.S. Lightfish into the water to run interdiction drills on threadbare comms—persistent eyes, low price. ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/11/u-s-navy-test-launches-interceptor-lightfish-drone-from-seychelles-coast-guard-ship?utm_source=openai)) - A skiff and “warning shots only” - UKMTO first flagged gunfire near Aden, then corrected: warning shots, no vessel targeted. Even in a lull, nerves stay tight on the route to Suez. ([marineinsight.com](https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/ukmto-advises-vessels-to-transit-with-caution-after-warning-shots-near-aden/?utm_source=openai)) - Four minutes over Pratas - A WZ‑7 drone crossed into Taiwan’s territorial airspace for minutes, then left—no intercept, big precedent, new legal headaches. ([taipeitimes.com](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/01/18/2003850781?utm_source=openai)) --- ## Geopolitical outlook - Europe and Ukraine - Deep‑strike economics are now part of coercion. As Ukrainian drones keep prying at Russian oil logistics and ports, expect EU/NATO to double down on mid‑tier air defense and to refine rules for seizing or fining shadow‑fleet tankers—while Moscow rattles sabers about naval “protection.” ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/90e731743c18d6d82c343314e07b1630?utm_source=openai)) - Indo‑Pacific - China’s first territorial overflight with a HALE drone signals more “presence by plastic” over islets. Allied responses will blend mobile anti‑ship missiles, autonomous ISR, and legal signaling to avoid normalizing these intrusions. ([ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/4b73bf1c-76a4-426f-a335-de8528b24acb?utm_source=openai)) - Global sea lanes - Red Sea transits are back—but fragile. Skiff activity and rumor‑to‑report cycles mean shipowners will prioritize cheap, layered defenses and tight comms with naval advisors. ([marineinsight.com](https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/ukmto-advises-vessels-to-transit-with-caution-after-warning-shots-near-aden/?utm_source=openai)) --- ## Watch next 1) FAA/DoD laser playbooks: formal “laser NOTAMs,” airspace kill boxes, and ID standards post‑El Paso. ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) 2) Operational HPM at a live base or ship vs. mixed raids (drones + rockets), not just demos. ([asdnews.com](https://www.asdnews.com/news/defense/2026/01/13/epirus-leonidas-demos-successful-use-highpower-microwave-defeat-fiberoptic-controlled-uas?utm_source=openai)) 3) More partner‑hosted USV launches in Africa/Med and sanction enforcement encounters with Russia’s shadow fleet. ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/11/u-s-navy-test-launches-interceptor-lightfish-drone-from-seychelles-coast-guard-ship?utm_source=openai)) 4) CCA autonomy at squadron scale—metrics on re‑tasking under jamming and human workload cuts. ([airandspaceforces.com](https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0/?utm_source=openai)) 5) Sustained Ukrainian strikes past 1,500 km—and Russian adaptations like mobile/refactored refinery bottlenecks. ([yahoo.com](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukraine-war-latest-sbu-claims-185024516.html?utm_source=openai)) --- Sources - U.S. Marines test fiber‑optic FPVs against jamming. National Defense Magazine. ([nationaldefensemagazine.org](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2026/2/19/marines-testing-first-person-view-drones-for-electronic-warfare?utm_source=openai)) - El Paso laser incident and airspace closure/balloons. Wall Street Journal. ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/a-laser-weapon-targeted-suspected-drones-it-hit-party-balloons-instead-fce8495f?utm_source=openai)) - Ukraine deep strikes: Ukhta (Komi) and Volgograd context; Taman port fires. Kyiv Independent via Yahoo; Moscow Times; AP. ([yahoo.com](https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukraine-war-latest-sbu-claims-185024516.html?utm_source=openai)) - Partner‑launched Lightfish USV at Cutlass Express. USNI News. ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/11/u-s-navy-test-launches-interceptor-lightfish-drone-from-seychelles-coast-guard-ship?utm_source=openai)) - Russia’s shadow‑fleet naval threats; tanker fine and release. The Guardian (news, live). ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/17/russia-threatens-to-deploy-navy-vessels-shadow-fleet-europe?utm_source=openai)) - HPM vs. fiber‑optic FPVs; prior swarm demos; modeling framework. ASDNews; Tom’s Hardware; arXiv; Aviation Week (Singapore MoU). ([asdnews.com](https://www.asdnews.com/news/defense/2026/01/13/epirus-leonidas-demos-successful-use-highpower-microwave-defeat-fiberoptic-controlled-uas?utm_source=openai)) - Red Sea resumption and Aden skiff incident. Marine Insight/UKMTO. ([marineinsight.com](https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/ukmto-advises-vessels-to-transit-with-caution-after-warning-shots-near-aden/?utm_source=openai)) - CCA mission autonomy vendors and flight testing. Defense Daily; Air & Space Forces Magazine. ([defensedaily.com](https://www.defensedaily.com/usaf-cca-mission-autonomy-phase-begins-with-software-from-collins-aerospace-and-shield-ai/air-force/?utm_source=openai)) - WZ‑7 overflight of Taiwan’s territorial airspace; lawfare framing. Financial Times; Taipei Times; Taipei Times op‑ed. ([ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/4b73bf1c-76a4-426f-a335-de8528b24acb?utm_source=openai)) Key terms - DE: directed energy (lasers/HPM). - HPM: high‑power microwave—non‑kinetic effect that disables electronics. - CCA: Collaborative Combat Aircraft—autonomous wingman drones. - FPV: first‑person‑view drone guided by onboard camera feed. - HALE: high‑altitude, long‑endurance drone. - GNSS: global navigation satellite systems (GPS, Galileo, etc.). - ROE: rules of engagement—when/how force may be used. - USV: unmanned surface vessel. - C‑UAS: counter‑uncrewed aircraft system.